The reform of resource tax needs to establish a set of institutional framework to prevent the transfer of reform costs and the rational use of resource tax.
The executive meeting of the State Council recently decided to amend the Provisional Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Resource Tax, increase the ad valorem rate of resource tax on the basis of the existing quota of resource tax, and adjust the rate of resource tax on crude oil, natural gas and other items. This means that, after more than a year of partial pilot projects, China's resource tax reform is making various preparations for spreading to the whole country (according to the People's Daily).
There is no need to repeat the significance of resource tax reform. In terms of transforming the economic development model, the reform of resource tax can force the transformation of resource exhausted model. Moreover, with the further promotion of China's total economic scale in the global position, this resource exhausted development mode is not only unbearable for China itself, but also for the world.
It is absolutely necessary to reform the resource tax. Now, the question people are worried about is, who will bear the resource tax burden that has increased significantly after the reform? At present, China's resource price mechanism is subject to multiple factors, and the most worried result is that in the absence of public participation, the rising costs caused by resource tax reform will eventually be passed on to the public.
For example, if the increased resource tax on crude oil is transferred to the retail price of refined oil, the burden of car owners, taxis and agricultural oil will inevitably increase; For another example, after the increase of coal resource tax, the power plant is likely to increase its costs, which will lead to increased pressure on electricity price rise, thus ultimately increasing the burden on the public.
If the reform of resource tax eventually becomes an institutional game of interest game and cost transfer, it will neither protect resources nor undertake the major mission of transforming the economic growth mode. Such reform will undoubtedly have a negative and anti livelihood impact on the people.
Therefore, under the pressure of rising domestic prices, to promote resource tax reform, we must have a systematic and overall design, taking into account the affordability of the people and small and medium-sized enterprises. On the one hand, we should avoid that the cost of reform is completely borne by the people and small and medium-sized enterprises, and on the other hand, we should prevent the overall increase of animal prices.
In this regard, the key to the reform of resource tax is to increase the ad valorem tax collection method, and perhaps there are more important institutional propositions: first, what is the purpose of resource tax, that is, it is necessary to establish a set of resource protection and compensation mechanism, not to collect taxes at the same time, but to let the public pay the cost of resource compensation through other ways at the same time; The second is to prevent the transfer of costs. The cost of resource tax reform should be borne by the state, local governments, enterprises and the people, rather than just letting the people pay for these price increases.
For example, under the current domestic inflationary pressure, especially the high oil price, whether the reform of resource tax can be combined with the reform of the price mechanism of refined oil, and consider the affordability of enterprises and residents, so that this reform can avoid short-term impact on people's livelihood as far as possible; Can we introduce some protective measures for SMEs in difficulty.
In a word, the reform of resource tax should have a systematic and overall design and a supporting reform. At the same time, it should ensure the people's right to know and participate, rather than further squeezing the people's income space and consumption capacity. The only criterion for judging the success of resource tax reform from the perspective of people's livelihood is whether to establish a system framework to prevent the transfer of reform costs and the rational use of resource tax.
□ Ma Guangyuan (scholar)
