Clausewitz once said that in order to achieve the goal in the war, the army does not always move forward without stopping. Gaps and pauses are the basic state of the army. Due to the existence of battlefield fog, the imprecise operational design, the increase of battlefield mutation factors, and the lack of firm operational execution, "gaps" in joint operations almost exist in all major and minor operations. If handled improperly or not timely and efficiently, it is likely to delay fighters, change from initiative to passivity, or even lose the achieved or consolidated results, It has a very adverse impact on the achievement of operational objectives. Only by strengthening the refined design of operations, reducing the fog of the battlefield, strengthening the execution of operations, adjusting actions in time according to the situation, and making each space, force, and action closely linked, efficiently linked, and complementary, can we reduce unnecessary "gaps" in operations, strive for operational initiative, and achieve the ultimate operational goal.

Fine design and operation throughout the whole process. In traditional operations, the operational design is not precise enough, resulting in the lack of close connection between action and action, force and force, time and space. Once an accident occurs, it may lead to "gaps" in operations, disrupt the operational rhythm, and affect the operational process. This requires strengthening the fine design of the whole operation process to reduce the occurrence of "gaps" in the operation. First, it is necessary to refine the operational purpose. The operational purpose should be divided into various indicators, and the degree of completion of the operational purpose should be specified to facilitate the accurate grasp and implementation of all levels. At the same time, it is also necessary to clarify the specific operational purpose and completion indicators of each operational phase, time period, and action, so that phased operational objectives can be mutually conditional and supportive, and "gaps" can be avoided from the operational purpose. Second, we need to carefully design operations. We should refine the operational tasks around the operational purpose, and then decompose the main and secondary operations. With the main operations as the main line, we should carefully design information, firepower, force and other support and cooperation operations, so that all kinds of operations can be closely linked, coupled, and mutually beneficial in terms of time, space, intensity, and frequency, and minimize the "gaps" between operations And control the leading power of action. Third, it is necessary to clarify the conversion conditions. It is necessary to fully anticipate the situations that may be faced in the operation, and specifically define the timing, content and method of conversion between various operations, forces, and time and space under different circumstances, especially the timing, content and method of early conversion, normal conversion, and delayed conversion between different operational stages, It enables real-time and accurate control throughout the operation to avoid "disconnection".

Multi domain awareness reduces blind spots. On the battlefield, both sides of the enemy always try to conceal their own battle attempts to achieve the suddenness of action. This "opacity" or even "deception" on the battlefield often brings uncertainty in the battle, which is likely to lead to frequent "gaps" in the battle, or even "interruptions" in the action. This requires strengthening multi domain perception to reduce the battlefield fog and reduce the "gaps" in the battle Probability of occurrence. First, to expand the field of perception, we should give full play to the advantages of our own reconnaissance strength, and at the same time pay attention to strengthening the information exchange and sharing mechanism with superiors and friends, so as to grasp the battlefield situation dynamically and accurately in real time; We should also pay attention to strengthening the acquisition and analysis of information on network hotspots, folk public opinion, security risks, etc., screen and verify the authenticity of information in many ways, improve the accuracy and reliability of information acquisition, and dispel the battlefield fog. The second is to focus on the key enemy situation. The focus of battlefield perception should be on acquiring the key information of the enemy situation in view of the implicit and explicit changes of the enemy situation in the battlefield, especially the acquisition of the enemy's main direction, main combat forces, mobile operations, support and support, and other information, so as to grasp the adjustment and changes of the enemy's operational center of gravity in real time to ensure that the key information of the enemy situation is accurate and reliable. The third is to master our own strength base. The unclear understanding of our own strength base in the war is also an important reason for the fog on the battlefield. Commanders and their command organs should understand and master our own combat strength progress, equipment damage, casualties and other information in real time through various channels and feedback information, scientifically assess the base and risk of combat capability, be aware of it, and avoid "weaknesses" Engage the enemy.

Strengthen the ability of resolute execution. "If there is no spirit of good fighting and boldness to dominate, then the pause will become a common thing." The reason for the "gap" in combat is closely related to the indecisiveness of the participants and the lack of strong and decisive execution. This requires strengthening the execution of operations to prevent "gaps" in operations due to poor execution. First, we should strengthen the execution of the situation. Under the favorable conditions of the smooth development of the battlefield and our own situation, we should make full use of the favorable battlefield situation created by our superiors or friendly neighbors, seize the rapidly changing fighters, decisively and quickly invest, take advantage of the momentum to develop attacks, attack and occupy the enemy's key areas or targets at one fell swoop, take the lead in promoting the development of the war situation, do not give the enemy any breathing room, and quickly achieve the purpose of operations. Second, we should strengthen the execution of adversity. When fighting under adverse circumstances, such as the enemy's superiority and inferiority, heavy war damage, dangerous environment, and unfamiliar terrain, we should focus on factors such as the superior's intention, the enemy's situation, our situation, and the battlefield environment. We should assess the situation, make rapid decisions, adapt measures to local conditions, and employ troops flexibly. We should resolutely complete combat tasks with swift, tenacious, and courageous execution, Ensure that the superior's operational intention is realized. Third, it is necessary to strengthen the cooperation execution force, support or cooperate with other forces in operations. It should obey the overall situation, actively coordinate, actively act, and closely cooperate, give full play to its own advantages, and be in step and highly integrated with the supported forces in time, space, frequency, and action, so as to support and cooperate with other forces in operations with firm execution force or even at all costs, Ensure that the overall operational objectives are achieved.

Timely adjust and control according to the situation. In the operation, once the action fails or the battlefield changes beyond expectations, if remedial measures are not taken or control is not adjusted in time, the "gap" in the operation may be prolonged due to the failure of follow-up forces or actions, giving the enemy more buffer or recovery time, or even being attacked by the enemy in retaliation. This requires timely adjustment and control according to the development and change of the battlefield situation to prevent falling into greater passivity. First, accurately predict the battlefield trend, and scientifically predict the enemy's possible next actions, key battle hubs, expected effects, etc., according to the actual situation of the battle losses of both sides, the characteristics of the enemy commander, our own combat capability, battlefield environment, etc., or use the simulation system auxiliary platform to conduct deduction and evaluation, and study and judge the advantages and disadvantages of the overall battlefield situation, Find out the next possible development direction and target of the overall operation, and provide reliable basis for adjustment and control. The second is to adjust the deployment to the nearest situation. In order to avoid the possibility of passivity in the battle, we should quickly adjust or supplement the forces in the local battlefield according to the development needs of the battlefield situation, around the main contradiction focus of the confrontation between the two sides, and in accordance with the principle of being near, being close to the situation, and being fast, so as to form a local battlefield advantage in the move, so as to enhance the offensive or defensive ability, and continue to attack, consume, or contain the enemy, Do not give the enemy any "clearance". The third is flexible and mobile control action. For the upcoming or already trapped passive situation, we should take advantage of the advantages and avoid the disadvantages, make decisive decisions, and quickly implement emergency battlefield support or flexible regulation from attack to defense and withdrawal from the battlefield in accordance with the requirements of first urgency then mitigation, first priority then subordination, first trust fire then force, first air then ground, to prevent further deterioration of the situation. (Xu Shiyong and Hu Shui)

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