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At the end of the third campaign, at 24:00 on January 6, 1951, the China North Korea Joint Division issued an instruction on recuperation and deployment, confirming that:
Except that the 1st Corps of the People's Army is on the west coast, the 50th Corps and the 1st Division of the 38th Corps of the Right Group (Column) of the Volunteer Army are on the front lines of Shuiyuan and Jing'anli to the south of the Han River, and the 1st Division of the 42nd Corps of the Left Group (Column) is on the front lines of Longtouli and Yangde Yard for reconnaissance and warning tasks, the rest of the departments are put to rest after the end of battle service.
The reserved rest position is:
The main force of the 38th Army is in the southwest of Pingchuan and the north of the Han River; the 39th and 40th Armies are near Wenshan Mountain and its north and south food producing areas and along the highway; the 42nd Army is in Jiaping and its east and north; the 66th Army is in the front line from Chunchuan to Huachuan; the 5th Corps of the People's Army is in the north and south of Hongchuan; the position of the 2nd Corps is to be determined.
On January 8, while announcing the end of the third campaign, the Volunteer Army Party Committee officially issued a rest order.
According to the deployment of the Volunteer Army Party Committee, the rest period is two months, from January 15, 1951 to March 15. There are six tasks during the rest period. The core requirement is to restore the combat effectiveness of the troops and prepare for the "decisive war" in the spring.
1. Li Qiwei's choice of attack and defense
After the end of the third campaign, there was a short silence on the Korean battlefield. Both belligerents are using this period of time to plan and prepare for the next battle, and coincidentally focus on attack rather than defense.
However, there is a time difference between the two sides in launching attacks:
In terms of the volunteer army, the next offensive is scheduled to be launched when the spring comes, with a rest period of about two months before it; However, the "United Nations Army" led by the US military quickly completed the transition from retreat to defense and from defense to attack, launching a new round of offensive before the volunteer army.
In this way, a major change has taken place in the attack and defense, advance and retreat, as well as the closely related initiative and passivity of the two belligerents in the Korean battlefield:
The Volunteer Army and the People's Army, which had always been in the initiative and were fully preparing for the next offensive campaign, had to rush to respond to the enemy in a defensive manner, while the "United Nations Army", which had been defeated all the way, suddenly became the aggressor again, and once again took the lead and initiative in battlefield operations.
The appearance of this situation is largely related to the top commander of the US military in the Korean battlefield, Li Qiwei.
Li Qiwei came to North Korea to take over the command of the 8th Army Group with the idea of resuming the offensive at the beginning. At the beginning of his term of office, he planned to turn the defensive into the offensive, but because the volunteer army quickly launched the third campaign, this idea could not be realized immediately on the battlefield.
In the case that the basic defense line of the "United Nations Army" on the 38th Front was breached overnight by the volunteer army, Li Qiwei could only focus on arranging the organized withdrawal of the "United Nations Army" troops in order to deal with the crisis, retreating southward from the vicinity of the 38th Front, and then standing firm when retreating to the vicinity of the 37th Front.
In the face of this rather embarrassing situation, Li Qiwei is different from MacArthur who tried to advocate either expanding the war or withdrawing from Korea, and from the military and political leaders in Washington who neither wanted to expand the war nor withdraw from Korea.
When the military generals in Tokyo and Washington were arguing about whether to stick to or give up North Korea, and were struggling about which defense line to use as the last defense line of the US military in North Korea, Li Qiwei thought of something else.
What haunted him was neither the retreat nor the organization of stubborn resistance on the existing defense line, but when and how to turn to a new attack.
In order to facilitate the planning of the attack, Li Qiwei moved his forward command post from the city to the tent in the wild.
He believes that:
"As a command post for direct command of combat, it should not be located in a building in a big city. Such a place is easy to physically and mentally isolate the personnel of the headquarters from those of the troops. Therefore, it is difficult for officers and staff of higher headquarters to compete with the troops they serve. As a result, mutual respect and trust cannot be achieved between higher authorities and troops; Such respect and trust are extremely important conditions for military success. "
2. Li Qiwei's Preparation for Attack
The way Li Qiwei chose the location of the forward command post was also somewhat special. He set his forward command post close to the military headquarters of the First Army, which could not only save security personnel, but also facilitate the use of the army's existing intelligence and communication networks for command and control.
According to his instructions, an airstrip was urgently built on a beach not far from the command post to take off and land his special B-17 light aircraft, so that he could easily fly back and forth between the forward command post and the basic command post in Daegu. The members of his forward command post were also reduced to the minimum - except for himself and two competent staff officers, there was only one orderly, one special car driver and one radio car driver cum radio operator.
In the tent of the Forward Command Post, Li Qiwei sat at a folding table made of plywood all day long, absorbed in studying the topographic map of the operational area specially drawn for him by the Army Cartographic Bureau, and pondered and drew up the operational plan with his assistant.
Li Qiwei made great efforts to analyze the battlefield terrain.
He spent a lot of time studying the map, and whenever there was any doubt, he flew to the scene for low altitude observation.
In his memoirs, he wrote with exaggeration:
"In short, I didn't stop until I felt that I could figure out the road in the battle area at night. In this way, I knew every road, every big lane, every mountain, every stream, and every mountain in the area we were fighting and planned to control as well as my own backyard. Therefore, when I consider sending troops into a certain area, I know whether the infantry should carry weapons, ammunition and rations to climb the two thousand foot mountain, whether they can transport heavy equipment into it, whether they can cross rivers, and whether they can find a road for wheeled vehicles. "
In order to inject the offensive spirit back into the depressed American troops, Li Qiwei took a series of special measures.
He sent an open letter to all officers and men of the 8th Army Group, calling on them to "trust their leaders, build confidence in completing tasks, and restore morale".
He vigorously reorganized the staff of the headquarters of the Group Army, severely criticized the irresponsible staff officers, ordered them to act in accordance with his intentions, and threatened that anyone who did not carry out the order would move his head. He also organized short-term exchanges between senior military officers of the army and navy to let sailors experience what it is like to climb heavily along rugged mountain roads under the threat of gunfire, and let the army soldiers see for themselves how difficult it is to carry out patrol tasks in cold waters, and how dangerous it is to remove snow from flight decks in the dark in the rough sea.
In this way, we can promote mutual understanding among different species and enhance team spirit.
The most striking thing is that Li Qiwei did not hesitate to use the tough means of "changing minds, changing people" to solve the problem of ineffective command of division level commanders.
In just one month, five US division commanders were transferred from their command posts.
They are Robert McClair, commander of the 2nd Division, David Barr, commander of the 7th Division, John Church, commander of the 24th Division, William Keane, commander of the 25th Division, and Hobart Gay, commander of the 1st Cavalry Division. With the exception of the 3rd Division and the 1st Marine Division, the division commanders of the first batch of US troops entering North Korea were all changed.
It is said that Li Qiwei thought of replacing these people before he took office. He once told Army Chief of Staff Collins that as far as his current commanders are concerned, they are unable to carry out future combat plans.
He believed that the previous casualties of the US military on the battlefield "were not all caused by bullets", but should be mainly attributed to "some military and division level commanders have lost the courage to fight after four to six months of hard fighting and discouraging results".
He decided to choose those who can "lead the troops to gain a firm foothold on the ground battlefield and achieve brilliant results" to replace those "weather beaten guys" to take the most important command posts.
With the incompetents stepping down one by one, a group of capable people trusted by Li Qiwei have entered the key positions at the division level.
Their ranks are all major generals, aged 49 to 51, including:
Clark Laffner, commander of the 2nd Division; Charles Palmer, commander of the 1st Cavalry Division; Blackhill Brian, Jr. - the 24th Division; Claude Ferrenberg, commander of the 7th Division; Joseph Bradley I, Division 25.
For the 8th Army Group, which has only 7 US divisions in its formation, this shift change has a meaning of "playing drums and drums again to start another round".
3. The ability of the US military to repair
Li Qiwei's strong and enterprising personal style undoubtedly played an important role in pushing the US military from defense to attack. However, the basic condition for the US military to quickly turn from retreat to attack was the strong military strength and war potential of the United States as the world's largest military power.
In particular, the rapid replenishment and recovery capability of the US military on the battlefield is really impressive. This is in great contrast to the volunteer army.
During the second campaign, the 2nd Division and the 1st Marine Division of the US Army suffered heavy losses in the western and eastern battlefields, respectively. After the campaign, they were forced to withdraw to the rear for rectification. However, it only took 30 days before and after the battle to re-enter the battlefield.
However, the 9th Corps of the Volunteer Army, which was left to rest in the rear due to serious downsizing in the same campaign, is still difficult to return to the front line to undertake combat tasks three months later. The obvious gap between the two sides in the recovery of combat capability undoubtedly has a crucial impact on the connection and conversion of the two campaigns. Under certain conditions, this influence is even decisive.
Li Qiwei took full advantage of the rapid recovery ability of the US military, and when the Volunteer Army ended its third campaign, he moved the 10th Army, as a group army reserve, from the rear to the vicinity of the 37th Front.
The initial purpose of this move was to plug the gap formed by the People's Army's breakthrough in Yuanzhou. However, when the Chinese and Korean armies had no new forces to put into deep combat, the 10th Army moved forward, making the 8th Group Army increase the force of a whole army on the front line. This led to an important change in the first line force comparison between the two sides, providing the necessary conditions for the US military to shift from retreat to attack.
At the same time, the US authorities also transferred a group of veterans from the mainland, Europe and Japan to the DPRK to supplement the front-line forces. In December alone, 33000 people were added as planned. A large number of tanks and artillery were also transported to North Korea, including 10 field artillery battalions and 140 medium-sized tanks sent by emergency sea through the code named "Operation Caryophyllus".
The arrival of these equipment has greatly improved the firepower and assault power of the front-line forces.
It was this super economic foundation of war, combined with Li Qiwei's personal role, that rewrote the process of the Korean War and led to the shift of attack and defense between the two sides.
4. Li Qiwei's ability to grasp the battlefield
At this time, for Li Qiwei, to turn to attack, it is urgent to understand the situation of the opponent in front of him.
First of all, when will the next offensive of the Chinese army be launched?
According to the initial estimate, the new offensive of the Chinese army will be launched between January 20 and 25. In order to prepare for the battle, Li Qiwei ordered all the ministries to speed up the rectification of the front and strengthen the defensive positions, increase the construction of concealed fortifications in the depth of the positions, and intensify the crusade against the People's Army guerrillas operating in the rear.
With the expected launch time of the Sino Singapore offensive approaching, there is a tense atmosphere in the "United Nations Army" defense area. After the first defense line near the Sanqi Line, the second defense line along the Jinjiang Xiaobai Mountains is also accelerating construction according to Li Qiwei's instructions.
However, after a period of time, there was no movement of the Chinese and Korean troops in front of them. The reconnaissance team sent by the US military also found no signs of the Chinese and Korean troops launching an offensive. Within 10 kilometers in front of the position, there is no enemy army.
Bradley wrote that he and other senior Pentagon generals were so nervous that they "held their breath". They were not sure whether Li Qiwei could withstand another attack by the Chinese army.
However, Li Qiwei has his own judgment. He believed that the reason why the Chinese and Korean armies did not continue to pursue southward, instead, they took the initiative to break away from the "United Nations Army" forces, could only explain that they had no ability to move forward.
He concluded that it was impossible for the Chinese and Korean armies to resume offensive operations in a short time, and this was an excellent opportunity for the 8th Group Army to turn to the counter offensive.
At this time, the staff department of the 8th Army Group inappropriately submitted to him a report entitled "The Ideal Allocation Position of the 8th Army Group from February 20 to August 31, 1951".
The report advocates:
If the Chinese army launches a new offensive, the 8th Army Group can make a slight resistance on the positions of the 37th Front and then retreat in stages; Before the arrival of spring (before March), retreat to the Jinjiang Xiaobaishan line; Before the arrival of summer (before June), retreat to the Busan defense circle near the Luodong River, that is, the position of the US and Korean troops before Incheon landing, as the last foothold that must be held.
Li Qiwei was furious after reading the report. He believed that the current action that the US military should take is not retreat, nor defense, but attack. Attack is the best defense, and only attack can win the initiative in a passive situation.
He put the report aside and made another plan himself:
The 1st and 9th US Armies coordinate their actions and advance northward in stages to find out the situation of the Chinese army in the front of the battle line, and prepare to advance to the Han River coast and stay there for a long time once the situation permits.
5. Test: Wolfhound Action
From January 15, according to the instruction of Li Qiwei, the 1st Army of the US Army began to implement the "Wolfhound Operation" aimed at finding out the situation in front of them.
The 1st Army is located on the left wing of the entire defense line of the 8th Group Army, and is deployed along the "E Line" in Pingze and Ancheng. Milburn decided that the 25th Division of the US Army would take the lead, and the 27th Regiment of the Division and the tank battalion of the Division would form a strengthened combat team. With the support of artillery and engineers, they would launch attacks on Suwon and Wushan.
The 27th regiment was nicknamed "Wolfhound", and he named the operation after it, code named "Wolfhound Operation". At the same time, the 3rd Division of the US Army was ordered to send infantry and tank units to cut off the section of Highway 20 from Suwon to Jinliangchangli, and the 1st Division of the Korean Army was ordered to send a battalion out to Chuanli on Highway 17 (about 5 kilometers south of Jinliangchangli), to cover the operation of the "wolf hounds".
The above US and South Korean military forces formed a number of reconnaissance and attack groups based on battalions and companies. With the support of aircraft and tanks, they used the tactics of stretching day and shrinking night, and moving and harassing to carry out exploratory attacks on the western outposts of the volunteer army.
Among them, the combat team of the 27th Regiment is the most active. Michaelis, the commander of the regiment, is the youngest regiment level chief officer of the 8th Group Army. He spared no effort in carrying out Li Qiwei's offensive intentions.
Under the guidance of aircraft, the combat team of the regiment marched northward along the main road with a capable detachment, and the spearhead of attack pointed directly at the important town of Wushan. The whole process was unexpectedly smooth. Except for a few volunteer outposts, there was almost no resistance on the way. The major trouble along the way was caused by the bridges destroyed by the US troops themselves and the mines laid.
Li Qiwei spoke highly of the "Wolfhound Operation", not because of the remarkable achievements of the operation, but because of the "aggressive spirit they have shown". On January 20, Li Qiwei ordered all army commanders to follow the example of the "Wolfhounds" and try to implement similar actions.
According to Li Qiwei's order, the 9th Army dispatched the 1st Cavalry Division, the 24th Division, the 6th Division of the Korean Army and the Australian Battalion to move northward with the goal of Jinliangchangli Lichuan section of the 20th Highway.
On the 22nd, the army focused on the 70th tank battalion, strengthened infantry, artillery and engineering units, formed the "Johnson Task Force" under the command of Harry Johnson, the head of the 8th Cavalry Regiment, and launched an attack on the outposts of the 112th Division of the 38th Volunteer Army.
By the 23rd, the attack group formed by the 9th Army had gone in and out of Lichuan for three times, occupied the place on the 24th, and then continued to carry out exploratory attacks northward.
Through the "Wolfhound Hunting Operation", the 1st Army of the US Army found that there was no large Chinese army within 10 miles (about 16 kilometers) of its face, that is, to the south of the line from Shuiyuan to Jinliangchang; The 9th Army also confirmed that there was no major Chinese army activity on the road from Jinliang Field to Lizhou via Lichuan.
6. Try again: Thunderbolt Action
In order to further understand the deployment of the Chinese army in the whole area south of the Han River, Li Qiwei immediately decided to launch another powerful reconnaissance with a greater distance and intensity, starting in the morning of January 25, code named "Operation Thunderbolt". According to this plan, the 1st and 9th Army of the US Army respectively sent out division sized troops strengthened by armored forces, Divide into several columns to advance to the front line of Hanjiang River.
Five stage lines are specified on the way to advance, with an interval of about 5 miles (about 8 kilometers) between each line to coordinate the actions of each column and ensure that each column can cover and coordinate with each other during the advance.
At the same time, the Fifth Air Force is required to provide maximum close air support to ground forces, and the Navy's 95th Task Force is required to provide naval gun fire support to cruisers and destroyers parked outside Incheon Port.
The day before the "Thunderbolt Operation", Li Qiwei took an adventure in person. Accompanied by Patrick, the commander of the 5th Air Force Air Force, he took an AH-6 advanced trainer and flew for 2 hours at low altitude within 20 miles (about 32 kilometers) in front of the first and ninth army vanguard forces to visually observe the target area, To confirm whether there is a large-scale build-up of Chinese troops there.
Li Qiwei wrote the reconnaissance flight experience into his memoir:
We sometimes fly at the height of treetops, and often fly below mountains. However, we hardly found any personal shadow, nor did we find any campfire smoke, ruts, or even tracks on the snow that could prove that there were a large number of troops.
Li Qiwei judged accordingly:
Due to the difficulty of logistical supply, the Chinese army can only maintain one week for each offensive campaign (the so-called "worship offensive"); Since the last battle crossed the 38th parallel, the transportation line of the Chinese army has been further extended, and the logistics supply must be unsustainable.
From the information obtained from air reconnaissance and ground power reconnaissance, the Chinese army is no longer capable of launching effective offensive operations.
For the US military and political authorities, Li Qiwei's judgment is of great significance.
Before that, the White House and the Pentagon had been worried about the difficulty of the US military in withstanding the new strong offensive of the Chinese army, or even in holding the last position on the Korean Peninsula.
After the Army Chief of Staff Collins, who is currently visiting North Korea, reported Li Qiwei's above judgment to Washington, the military and political leaders of the White House and the Pentagon immediately felt relieved.
In Bradley's words:
"This inspiring news... spread all over the top, and you can hear many words of comfort"; It "marks the turning point of our attitude towards North Korea. For the first time, we believe that even under our self imposed combat restrictions, China cannot drive us out of North Korea".
It took three months from the first confrontation between the Chinese and American armies on the Korean battlefield to Li Qiwei's judgment.
7. The cost of underestimating the enemy
During this period, Americans' understanding of the Chinese army has undergone great changes:
From the extreme contempt at the beginning, to the indescribable fear later, to a more objective assessment.
This process led to a phased change in the US military's operational guidelines: from unrealistic subjective assumptions at the beginning, to gradually becoming sober and pragmatic.
When this change is reflected in the battlefield competition, the confrontation between the two sides in the battlefield will rise to a new level.
It should be noted that the changes in the operational guidance completed by the US military under the leadership of Li Qiwei did not immediately attract serious attention from the volunteer army.
The victory of the first three campaigns made the Volunteer Army have the impression that the combat effectiveness of the US military is "just so". Because the sudden factors in the first three campaigns have worked several times, and the tactics of outflanking have been successful, the volunteer army has gradually formed a certain pattern in its operational design.
In addition, the problems in logistics supply were not exposed so fully and fatally because the battle field was not too far away from the domestic border, which also affected the accurate understanding of their own weaknesses to a certain extent. All these hidden dangers emerged with the passage of time and the development of the war process, and became the cause of battlefield defeat in subsequent campaigns.
It can be said that the war entered a more difficult stage than before when the US military had some understanding of the Chinese army's bottom card and tried to seize its weaknesses to make a big fuss.
In order to win on the battlefield, the volunteer army will have to face more and more difficulties and dangers, and pay more and more sacrifices. Before finding an effective way to compensate for its own weaknesses and shortcomings, this situation is difficult to fundamentally reverse.
This is the price that must be paid to fight against a strong enemy, and it is not subject to the subjective will and desire of people.
On the day of the launch of "Operation Thunderbolt", the 1st and 9th Army of the US Army entered the front lines of Shuiyuan, Jinliangchangli and Lichuan and entered the starting position of the attack.
So far, since the beginning of the "Wolfhound Operation", the US forces on the western front have advanced 20 to 30 kilometers north from the vicinity of the March 7th Line. According to the new battlefield situation and further understanding of the deployment of Chinese and Korean troops, Li Qiwei decided:
Lose no time to link the "Thunderbolt Operation", which was originally a tactical action of power reconnaissance, with the larger campaign attempt of "destroying the enemy's forces and giving the enemy maximum damage", and establish the counter offensive target of attacking northward and reaching the Han River.
As the US military war history says:
"A few hours after the start of the operation, Operation Thunderbolt has been conceived as a comprehensive attack in essence."
On February 5, the US and South Korean forces located in the middle east of the front also ended the month long entanglement with the Korean People's Army's Eastern Front combat forces in Yuanzhou and its surrounding areas, and launched a comprehensive offensive code named "Operation Roundup".
In this way, all the ground combat forces in the 8th Army Group consist of 16 divisions, 3 brigades and 1 airborne regiment, with a total force of more than 250000 people, and almost all of them are engaged in this large-scale and all-around battle level counter offensive.
(End of text)
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