[Watson News] JD fell out of favor: how the market value of 30 billion dollars disappeared

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Investors are abandoning JD.

Its long-time supporter Hillhouse Capital reduced its holdings of JD by 600 million dollars in a quarter, accounting for as much as 40%; Large secondary market funds such as Fidelity are also selling Jingdong shares; Morgan Stanley cut the target price of JD by 30%.

This is not only because of the Black Swan incident - JD founder Liu Qiangdong was suspected of sexual assault in the United States, and its market value fell by $7.2 billion within two days. Before this, JD had been looked down on by the capital market, and its market value has dropped from a high of $65.4 billion a quarter ago to $37.2 billion today.

 

Above: JD's share price in recent half a year; Below: Pinduoduo Stock Price

Once, among the two giants of China's e-commerce, Alibaba seemed to be the one with limited potential who has eaten up Chinese netizens and touched the ceiling; For Jingdong, it is a vast world with great achievements.

 

However, in the four years after the two companies went public, Alibaba's growth rate has been higher than that of JD, expanding overseas and attacking new offline retail markets. While the growth rate of JD slowly declined to 30%, the growth rate of Ali's e-commerce business was as high as 60%.

Above: JD's revenue and growth rate; Below: Ali e-commerce revenue and growth rate, from Guotai Jun'an Research Newspaper

 

Now, the situation is even worse - the sinking city market that was waiting for Jingdong to reclaim was suddenly planted with the landing flag by Pinduoduo.

A person close to Jingdong told 36 Krypton that Liu Qiangdong once conveyed his attitude internally that Pinduoduo is just a trick on the flow side, and the core of retail is still supply chain and logistics.

A JD executive evaluated Pinduoduo in this way: This is not a business that JD can do, because JD does not have a low-end supply chain of 9 yuan and 9 yuan; JD believes in "consumption upgrading".

Xu Xin, a long-term investor of JD and Capital Today, once said in an interview with 36 Krypton that he missed Pinduoduo because he "didn't follow up carefully and need to review". "But every retail revolution, in the final analysis, must be able to create new value. What is the value created by Pinduoduo? Is it more fun to work together? Or is it fun to work together for 10 yuan less than 2 yuan? Personalized recommendation makes people enjoy themselves more and more, wasting time? " This may also be a lateral reflection of JD's mentality.

"If it encounters a company with lower cost and higher efficiency than JD, it will panic, but when it encounters a new species completely different from itself, it will deny or even ignore it from the heart." A former senior official of JD told 36 Krypton.

When Pinduoduo was mocked as the "evening of Pinduoduo" selling fake goods after its listing, it suddenly announced its cooperation with NetEase - Pinduoduo's supply chain and inferior goods problems seemed no longer a major problem, and its market value rose by 30% instantly.

JD, which has 300 million users, and "300 million people are buying" are competing for a lot, and JD has suddenly become the lonely one.

In terms of "creating value", JD has built a model of China's B2C e-commerce logistics with great determination and efforts - it has invested heavily in logistics construction for many years, even been broken by the capital chain for many years, and it has also paid five insurances and one fund for its own hundreds of thousands of couriers - and even Alibaba has finally become a "novice" to learn from it.

However, in terms of "price", it was easily caught up by the latecomers.

It is hard to say what serious mistakes Jingdong has made, but the rapid changes in the competitive environment and the encirclement and suppression of the old and new enemies have made its way full of rivals' flags.

This leads to a question: will companies like JD just keep going along with their traditional core advantages, or must they be ready to change at any time or be abandoned by the times? How can huge organizations like JD change with time?

This is simply a proposition of the times.

Unexpected Disruptors

Finally, "Jingdong Shopping" began to attract high profile investment in March this year, one after another with the launch of Taobao's special edition.

But in fact, as early as 2014, JD has tasted the benefits of social play. At that time, led by the original Tencent e-commerce team incorporated into JD, it launched "bargaining" and "fission red packet", and shared hundreds of millions of cases.

But Jingdong didn't pay attention to this game until the end of last year. Prior to this, Pinduoduo (formerly Pinhaohuo) had entered the top 15 WeChat turnover in 2016 - even though Alibaba could not see this data, JD, Tencent's most important e-commerce partner, should not be unconscious; In that year, Pinduoduo's round B financing was contested by various VC firms, and Tencent became its shareholder; Since then, Pinduoduo's advertising has spread all over the streets in 2017. By the second half of the year, its order volume exceeded that of JD, which has become an open secret in the investment field.

There are two conditions for successful shopping: you can play on WeChat (which excludes Ali), and you need to have "low price" products.

In terms of WeChat support, JD is advantaged by nature - only it has two centralized entrances in WeChat, namely "discovery shopping" and "I wallet JD optimization". Other e-commerce companies invested by Tencent, including Mushroom Street and Vipshop, have only one entrance.

It's normal to miss an opportunity, but the most painful thing is that the opportunity was just around the corner.

But the most troubling thing for JD is that "there has always been a voice saying that JD is high quality and high-end, and we don't want to do the goods that we think are very low." A JD management said that this made them ignore that the demand of the Chinese market is diversified, "we are too tangled, too limited by the current situation."

In other words, for JD, which relies on "genuine goods" to succeed, and even spends a lot of advertising money to create the image of "quality life", shopping together is anti intuitive and anti traditional beliefs.

Pinduoduo has proved that Pinduoduo is suitable for products with ultra-low customer price and low decision-making threshold, which is far from the existing brands, goods and users of JD. Liu Qiangdong said at the senior management meeting after the first quarter financial report this year, "If you look at the Top 10 or Top 100 list of Pinduoduo, you will find that they almost overlap with JD's mainstream users and mainstream products... Although the mode of JD is the same as Pinduoduo in terms of shopping, the products, user experience and Pinduoduo are completely different."

So, should JD not do this business at all?

Looking back at the history of Jingdong, its growth has always depended on two routes: one is to expand from the geographical location and sink from the first tier cities to the second tier cities or even lower tier cities, which is marked by its growing list of "211 time limited cities"; The second is category expansion.

JD has been trying to capture the sinking market for many years: in 2013, JD's O2O business cooperated with Tangjiu Convenience Store in Shanxi, trying to solve O2O and channel sinking with one stone and two birds; At the beginning of 2014, JD released five strategies, one of which is the sinking of channels, and home appliances are the first category to sink, by opening "JD home appliance stores" in villages and towns across the country through franchise; In 2015, the New Channel Business Department was established, hoping to turn the husband and wife store into a JD convenience store, so as to sink goods and brands.

In the struggle for the sinking market over the years, JD can see Ali as its rival. Jingdong's office area is often close to Ali's office, and the two companies compete to recruit rural promoters.

But in terms of effectiveness, the traditional model is heavy and difficult. On the one hand, the traditional retail channels are also evolving. Small stores no longer need many dealers to get goods from manufacturers, and the efficiency is not low; On the other hand, the traditional channel is actually "deep water", and does the goods carry tax points? Is it parallel, fake, or licensed? The price gap is particularly large, and JD's supply chain cannot guarantee that small stores will make money.

Jingdong Xintong used to do a lot of special shampoo activities with P&G, but in many community husband and wife stores, shampoo is a category with poor dynamic sales, so there are many fakes and high profits. "When the goods from New Channel enter, they are dumped by the dealers," said a former employee of New Channel.

"The essence of flopping is to plant the thinking of the regular army in an informal retail business. The store that supports the family is already the lowest cost unit. Who would be willing to change a set of door light box for at least 8000 yuan, and the family would make profits in two months?" a senior retail personage told 36 Krypton.

In the final analysis, the rise of Pinduoduo does not simply stimulate a pile of orders, but is a new scheme to leverage users in the sinking market.

However, it has been the last year that it has become a common view to link Pinduoduo and leveraging the sinking market. In the early days, most people, including Jingdong and Liu Qiangdong, did not gain this insight.

Why didn't Jingdong and Liu Qiangdong realize this earlier? A person close to Liu Qiangdong commented that "Lao Liu is an absolutely confident person". He is highly sensitive to business, but many new economy companies in the Internet field have broken away from the logic and framework of traditional business.

"The first tier market is full, so do you want to explore new markets? We have always called for sinking into the third and fourth tier cities, but we have not thought about whether your approach is 100% effective in sinking into the lower tier cities, and whether there is a more effective way?" Recently, a Jingdong management reflected. "Maybe we are restricted by the way of success in the past, so we are not so easy to accept some (new ideas)."

A person close to JD told 36 Krypton that Liu Qiangdong's internal attitude at the beginning of this year was that the core of retail was still supply chain and logistics, which was JD's strength, while group building was just a "tactic".

"This is in line with JD's consistent way of thinking, which believes that cost-effective experience is the only important thing, and it is easy to buy together." The above person commented.

However, judging from the current results of JD's launch of shopping at the beginning of the year, it is not easy to do a good job. Li Liang, a big business in Ali, Jingdong and Pinduoduo, said to 36 Krypton that although Jingdong has given "Pinduo" traffic preference, such as the search ranking rising, he sold a daily merchandise product of about 15 yuan, which sold about 70000 pieces in Pinduoduo last week, and 5000 to 10000 pieces in Taobao's low-priced version, In the same period, less than 2000 pieces were sold in JD.

Another big business operating small household appliances also said to 36 krypton that the amount of shopping together was "very average".

In terms of supply, JD.com used its most convenient method. Several merchants told 36 Krypton that although Pogou launched foreign investment, it did not make great efforts to promote it. Most of the merchants were original PoP merchants (JD third-party platform), that is, the goods were still the same inventory.

Jingdong officials said that they were promoting factory direct supply and specialty products, but the strict access slowed down the progress, and the proportion of old and new products would be adjusted from 8:2 to 5:5 in the future.

"To put it bluntly, it is just a channel entrance, not much different from the 'second kill' in the past." Li Liang was disappointed with JD's strategy. He believes that the better way is for JD to open a new battlefield, such as restarting filming. More importantly, the supply chain should be rebuilt. "The quality of Pinduoduo is 1.0. You can upgrade it to 1.5 and wait for Pinduoduo to upgrade. But your product grade cannot be 3.0 or 4.0, which is too high-end."

"Jingdong Pogou is trying to copy only the form, not the core." A senior e-commerce industry person said frankly.

It is also worth rethinking that, in today's rising traffic prices, is it really ingenious to play with traffic? Is the flow more valuable, or is the supply chain more valuable?

The proliferation of low-quality goods and fake goods in Pinduoduo has caused widespread contempt of consumers in the Fifth Ring Road. However, its announcement of cooperation with NetEase Yanxuan is enough to make us think that for a world factory like China, it seems not so difficult to cooperate with the supply chain and factories.

Pinduoduo is obviously a surprise attack of "disruptive innovation". When Jingdong decided to face this opponent, the market value of nearly 30 billion dollars was hard to kill.

The Story of Hema

If Pinduoduo is outside the traditional vision of JD, but in the fresh food supermarket and new retail, which it has been tracking for many years, JD has long seen that offline fresh food stores are difficult to be replaced by e-commerce, and has invested in Yonghui, a fresh food supermarket, in 2015. JD has also fallen behind unexpectedly.

Jingdong's 7 fresh opened in January 2018, two years later than the first store of Ali's Hema Xiansheng, and also lags behind similar Yonghui Superspecies and Suning Suxiansheng. At present, the list of Hema App stores shows that it has opened and will open more than 100 stores in 11 cities across the country, while JD 7 Fresh has only two stores, both in Beijing.

Hema is the earliest product in Ali's "new retail" system, and also the star project that attracts the most attention in the market. But its founder Hou Yi came from Jingdong. The outside world is talking about it.

So why did Hou Yi and his project shine in Ali, but Jingdong missed them? Why is 7 fresh far away from the goal proposed in the middle of the year (to open 50 stores by the end of 2018) when Hema can conquer cities and territories?

The story of Hou Yi leaving JD to start his own business and joining the Alibaba camp has two incompletely conflicting versions.

A person from Hou Yi told 36 Krypton that Hou Yi once talked about the prototype of the box horse with the relevant person in charge of Jingdong, and everyone thought that the model was too heavy and the return was too slow. At the end of 2013, on the eve of Hou Yi's departure, Liu Qiangdong proposed to have a deep talk with Hou Yi, revealing his investment intention. However, Hou Yi waited for two weeks and did not see Liu. "Shen Haoyu (then CEO of Jingdong Mall) explained to Hou Yi that Lao Liu probably didn't think well," said the person.

"I don't think Hou Yi told President Liu about this idea. President Liu didn't approve of it, so he went to Ali. More likely, he had already talked with Ali when he left." A senior Jingdong official speculated about 36 Krypton.

JD and Alibaba have explored the new retail field (called "O2O" in the early years) for many years. Hou Yi used to be the "general head of the O2O Business Department" during JD's exploration. In 2013, he once led the cooperation between JD and Tangjiu Convenience Store in Taiyuan, Shanxi, as a model of cooperation between JD and offline convenience stores: let Tangjiu Convenience Store open a store in JD on the one hand, borrow its convenience store to become a pickup point on the other hand, and provide 1-hour convenience store goods delivery service.

But this project was never mentioned again. A JD insider told 36 Krypton that the Tangjiu project was very unsuccessful; Hou Yi's practices at that time also caused internal dissatisfaction. For example, in order to increase the order volume of the Tangjiu project, he deliberately suppressed JD's online sales in Taiyuan - in other words, it was a fight between the left and the right within JD.

Later, JD focused on the transformation of the wife and husband shop, but Du Shuang, the person in charge, left in July last year, and the project transformation also encountered setbacks in this direction.

At the same time, Alibaba has suffered many failures in new retail. Alibaba began to cooperate with Yintai and other companies in 2012, engaging in online and offline linkage, with no obvious effect; In 2014, we will simply invest in Yintai. According to 36 Krypton, Hema was officially registered in 2014, and Ali has a very high share.

Looking at the two e-commerce companies' attempts in new retail, JD has been trying to leverage the light model of partners, while Ali is the one that pays more attention - by 2017, Ali had simply invested nearly 20 billion yuan to start Yintai's privatization.

"Ali's investment in the Hema project is not about losses. Its strategy is not to run through single stores and expand again, but to suddenly expand the scale to hundreds of thousands and redefine the model," said an e-commerce person.

Hou Yi also said on some occasions that without Ali's financial and technical support, Hema could not be made. "The difficulty is that even if you open a store, you need to build a complete system, which becomes a huge threshold. If you continue to work for hundreds of millions and have not done it for two years, investors will be anxious." Hou Yi said.

Alibaba has shown great tolerance and patience in the Hema project. At first, Hema was actually a boxed lunch project, and then it was transformed into a store. This is related to Alibaba's strategic focus on new retail. Not only does Jack Ma preach for new retail, but the specific implementation is led by Zhang Yong, CEO of Alibaba Group and the incoming chairman of Alibaba's Board of Directors.

A person close to Jingdong told 36 Krypton that Jingdong would look at Hema from a financial point of view and think that it was "untenable to lose so much". A senior retail personage speculated that 7 Fresh did not continue to open stores, which could not be an objective resistance, but a subjective shake. "The purpose of opening stores is to make money, and when it finds that it does not make money, it will shrink back."

Wang Xiaosong explains why 7 Fresh only opened two stores: last year, there was no large-scale property search. If you want to open two tests first, you need to run through the model first.

According to 36 Krypton, 7 fresh is not a project promoted by Liu Qiangdong alone. He is persuaded.

Seized battlefield and abandoned market

Looking at the overall layout of the two major e-commerce companies in new retail, or offline business, Ali is playing a big game: it has not only made a star case like Hema, but also made up its own weakness - the $9.5 billion acquisition of Yule, and obtained the last mile of distribution system.

In contrast, when Liu Qiangdong "returned" to take over the front-line business again in 2016, an important decision was to give the most important carrier of its O2O, which has been operating independently for a year, "Jingdong to Home" to Dada, led by the Dada team.

Earlier, Liu Qiangdong referred to it and JD Finance as the business model innovation of "finding around the main business of e-commerce", and placed great expectations - for the home business, distribution is the most important, which is JD's strength. Investing in Yonghui as a big KA merchant in home business is also in the chess game.

When Liu Qiangdong returned to the front line, JD's share price fell to a low point. Liu Qiangdong believed that the problem was that JD's organizational efficiency and combat effectiveness were declining. Liu's own definition was "around August 2016, JD was the most difficult time."

Since then, Liu Qiangdong's series of actions have focused on comprehensively improving efficiency, execution and tension in the main business. According to the financial magazine, there is even a rumor that "some senior executives will decide to stay or leave because of the 618 achievements" in JD; Liu Qiangdong also focused on the clothing business of Alibaba, and even went abroad to attract investment from big brands; The detailed rules for improving efficiency were announced internally, and even angered several times.

Xu Lei said that since 2016, each business unit has obviously attached more importance to profit and loss than before, and managers should not only calculate big accounts but also small accounts.

In other words, under the leadership of Liu Qiangdong, the rhythm of JD has changed to focus on traditional core business and fight against Alibaba.

At the same time, innovative and unprofitable businesses were abandoned.

Jingdong is the unprofitable business.

"Although JD App has given the entrance to home, the conversion rate of that entrance is not high," said an employee before JD arrived home. This directly aggravates the pressure of getting customers in the home business, leading to a large reduction in supply and heavy subsidies.

"It cost us 30 yuan to get a new customer, and it cost us 100 yuan to get a customer when Jingdong went home, because Tongtou did not optimize." A founder of the O2O field recalled that Jingdong went home and had extensive business problems. Another e-commerce practitioner also said that at that time, JD's mobile terminal lagged behind, and its launch strategy was still focused on the PC terminal. Instead of focusing on the mobile terminal, the launch followed JD's big framework, "causing dislocation and waste."

A former JD.com employee said to 36 Krypton that the JD.com team had also thought of various ways in the later period, but there was no accounting between subsidies and freight costs, and they could not extend themselves upstream to increase profits by controlling the supply of goods. In the end, the labor contracts of all employees from Jingdong to home were transferred to Dada.

A person familiar with the situation told 36 Krypton that by the middle of 2016, JD Home had lost more than 2 billion yuan, and the ratio of revenue to loss was as high as 1:1.

O2O (JD to Home) was one of JD's four strategies at the beginning of 2016. The other three are intelligent, international and financial. With Liu Qiangdong taking over the front-line business again, overseas and intelligent businesses are returned to the mall, and financial businesses are separated independently.

After the spin off of JD to its home, JD quickly made up losses based on Non GAAP in the second quarter of 2016.

The embarrassment is that JD Home and O2O, which JD gave up, are the prototype of new retail. At the time of JD's sale, Ali was buying heavily. Today, Alibaba and Meituan are the most powerful players in the new retail field, competing for the "offline Amazon" market from delivering takeout, fresh food to everything.

Meituan is listed today, with a market value of about 400 billion Hong Kong dollars (equivalent to 51 billion US dollars), more than JD.

Jingdong's Genes

In terms of business model, JD itself has limitations: as a retail company, JD's gross profit is not high, which naturally makes it less tolerant of innovation and loss.

Even after expanding from the early low margin 3C category to the high margin category and increasing the open platform commission and advertising revenue, JD's gross margin has risen from 5% seven years ago to 13.5% in Q2 2018, but it is also far lower than that of Internet companies such as Alibaba - Alibaba's gross margin was 50.7% in the same period.

"Ali's business is very diversified, even if its gross profit is at the next point, it will have little impact. But JD is small in size and low in profit margin. Once it pursues profitability, it will have no room for loss," said a former senior Jingdong official.

But JD has never been afraid of losses in history, including the large-scale logistics construction that has attracted the attention of the industry, the war with Suning Gome on household appliances, and the zero profit mopping up on books. Jingdong has built its own barriers by huge losses.

Even today, its large investment in logistics will still be questioned: in the past two years, JD's storage area has tripled, and its logistics revenue has increased by three digits year-on-year. However, the secondary market institutions believe that this model of high investment and low gross profit is not sexy enough.

This once made people compare JD with Amazon, not only because Amazon also started from B2C retail e-commerce business with very low gross profit, but also because both companies are not afraid of huge losses.

But just as Bezos is behind Amazon's huge investment, behind JD's strategic losses are Liu Qiangdong's strong will and determination. In other words, once Liu Qiangdong does not support it, JD is hard to make up its mind to do a business with huge losses.

Jingdong has become much larger than ten years ago when Liu Qiang Dongli pushed ahead of the public discussion, built his own logistics with surprising courage, and expanded to all categories: the number of team members has expanded from 1500 to 170000, a hundred times increase. Is Liu Qiangdong able to see everything at this time?

Tencent generates WeChat and Alibaba generates nails by internal horse racing and bottom-up innovation. Can Jingdong go this way after becoming bigger?

JD Organization Chart

The outside world has a highly unified evaluation of Liu Qiangdong's employment characteristics: able to work and fight.

 

The pursuit of efficiency and strong execution is the first characteristic of the retail industry, which stresses the tight fit of the organizational chain. Secondly, the super professional quality and management authority from Liu himself will be transmitted from top to bottom and penetrate into the organizational gene of JD. At the business level, it is characterized by rewarding the diligent and punishing the lazy, and putting execution first. In terms of values, we highly value the right way to success. "JD has only one value," said a former employee of JD.

A former employee of JD familiar with overseas business told 36 Krypton that it only took 60 days for the middle platform of JD Indonesia Station to go online from development, which requires cooperation across four regions and more than 20 departments, and the difficulty is equivalent to creating an online JD; In the daily WeChat work group, if a leader sends a certain instruction, his subordinates will queue up to reply "Yes", which makes him feel that JD is a company that is "cohesive" and forbids.

"Sense of security" is also the usual description of JD by front-line employees. "The company solves the problem of food, clothing, housing and transportation. There are promotions every day. It feels like a big country enterprise," said a former employee of Jingdong. "If you can make a screw, you can still stay in Jingdong."

However, another former employee who joined JD with Yi Xun believes that JD's culture is "depressing" compared with Tencent - he has attended morning meetings where some bosses sit and employees stand around in the conference room, and witnessed a mall executive standing behind a new employee for several minutes to observe silently.

Hou Yi's departure may be another proof of Jingdong's cultural characteristics. JD's internal evaluation of Hou Yi is that his brain hole is very big and his voice is very loud, but his execution is not strong. But in Alibaba's context, "big brain hole" is a commendatory word.

"Jingdong's culture is that leaders lead you, while Ali's culture is that leaders' fool you," a former e-commerce leader of a major brand told 36 Krypton.

JD also encourages internal innovation, but more is "micro innovation" for business process improvement. For example, how to reduce one link of logistics and improve it by several seconds.

Once the innovation is separated from the main business, the success probability of JD's innovation will be greatly reduced. For example, JD Smart once developed independently as an independent subsidiary. Wang Zhenhui, a veteran who was then in charge of JD Smart, also admitted that the final result was "not satisfactory to himself". JD Smart ended up in the mall.

In other words, JD may be a powerful retail machine, but if it wants to make great innovations, it is hard to hope that the organization can "bottom-up" and rely on ordinary employees and management.

JD's success or failure is highly dependent on Liu Qiangdong, the founder who holds 80% of the voting rights and has the highest authority in the company.

Amazon's development of Kindle, AWS cloud service and Echo came from the promotion and interest of its founder Bezos. Just as Musk was interested in space and rockets, he made SpaceX instead of relying on Tesla's internal low-level innovation.

Liu Qiangdong's interest seems hard to find in recent years. In the news, you can see that he returned home in fine clothes, traveled with his wife, and was enthusiastic about social welfare.

However, on the commercial level, Liu Qiangdong has rarely made a voice in recent years, except for two rare things: last year, he wrote an article on "building block organization" to discuss how to quickly couple departments; In addition, he hopes JD will transform into a technology company, whose technology is mainly reflected in unmanned aerial vehicles, unmanned warehousing and distribution.

Today, the challenge for JD is not whether it can survive - its gross profit has risen, and the cost of performance has narrowed from 8.4% two years ago to 6.7% today - even if it continues to optimize for the existing 300 million users and provide more goods and services, it is enough to continue to support the annual transaction volume of more than one trillion yuan.

Its challenge is that the challenger who was once ridiculed and could not understand is no longer a challenger.

Jingdong is worried

Faced with all this, Jingdong is also worried.

 

At the senior management meeting after Jingdong's second quarter financial report, the official said that the proportion of third-party platform merchants involved in shopping increased from 16% in the first quarter to 40%. Jingdong officials also said that in August, the proportion of new customers who bought together accounted for nearly 28% of Jingdong's market, and more than 62% came from third - to sixth tier cities. This means that the core goal of the current shopping mix is to promote innovation and sink.

This has also spawned some cases of fraud for impulse. According to a data obtained by Krypton 36, some people use the banner of "Jingdong Free Day" to attract potential users to buy goods and promise to "refund". It is easy to speculate from the "Swipe" guide that counterfeiters want to avoid JD's internal anti swipe risk control and forge orders into new customer orders obtained from WeChat.

Jingdong, once abandoned, came home and is now picked up again by Jingdong. In August this year, Dada Jingdong announced that it had completed the financing of 500 million US dollars, and Jingdong increased its holdings, aiming to use it as a key link for a large number of offline merchants.

 

Wang Xiaosong, senior vice president of JD and president of the mall's fast moving consumer business group, directly managed 7 fresh. He frankly told 36 krypton in early September that the current store opening speed was "not a little slow, but too slow", but he will strive to achieve the goal of dozens of stores this year. A day earlier, JD announced that it had signed contracts with 16 real estate developers, including Poly and Joy City, to launch the store opening process in several first tier cities.

It is also possible to take a late attack. For example, did the late Meituan ever catch up with the hungry.

But the latter should fight hard. Meituan is an experienced team of continuous entrepreneurs, with an iron army that has been trained and tested, fighting against a young team of students who start businesses. In Pinduoduo, Meituan and Alibaba, there are no weak players in Pintuan and the new retail battlefield.