Share reform and the utility of warrants: introducing warrants into share reform is worse than worse

The introduction of warrants at the current stage of the development of China's stock market is extremely inappropriate both in strategy and strategy, which is another typical example of blindly copying the experience of mature stock markets to develop China's stock market.

Obviously, because

At this historical juncture of reform, the introduction of warrants into the institutional design of the split share structure reform and the introduction of derivatives with an obvious option nature, especially warrants with a short mechanism, will inevitably exacerbate and amplify market volatility and turbulence. The author believes that this seriously untimely measure has injected new unstable market variables and institutional variables into the already extremely unstable market, which is undoubtedly worse for the weak market.

First of all, the introduction of warrants in the reform of non tradable shares and the strengthening of the marketization game between the holders of tradable shares and non tradable shares fundamentally negated the internal differences between tradable shares and non tradable shares. As we all know, the most important feature of warrant mode is market-oriented game. The introduction of warrant method to solve the split share problem is to adjust the consideration mode to the game mode, and its essence is to solve the split share problem in a market-oriented way. In a sense, this is a copy of the way in which the state-owned stock market price was reduced in 2001, and the negative impact on the market is incalculable.

Second, to say the least, it is difficult to avoid its negative effects even if the warrant method is used as an auxiliary means to solve the split share structure. It is obvious that if we adopt warrants as an integral part of consideration, it will undoubtedly reduce the consideration coefficient and its proportion of non tradable shareholders to tradable shareholders. In this case, the actual benefits obtained by the holders of tradable shares will also be correspondingly reduced, and the benefits of the holders of non tradable shares may be increased.

Third, the implementation of warrants will, on the one hand, provide non tradable shareholders with a fast cash flow channel, and on the other hand, make the relationship between supply and demand in the market change too quickly or even significantly. This measure, which is easy to expand the market instability variables, will directly lead to a more serious downward shift in the market focus, making the pilot market environment more adverse.

More seriously, because the non tradable shareholders of listed companies hold large and concentrated shares, and the proposal right to solve the split share structure is in the hands of non tradable shareholders, which makes it possible or possible for them to take advantage of their institutional advantages, market advantages and shareholding advantages to increase or sell short, Thus, in the process of increasing market risk, it further erodes and infringes the interests and rights of shareholders of tradable shares.

It should be emphasized that the resolution of split share structure is a significant and far-reaching institutional and market reform in China's stock market. Whether in accordance with the internal laws of the market or the requirements of the Nine Opinions of the State Council, the promotion of this change requires a relatively stable market environment and a relatively clear institutional arrangement. Without such environment and atmosphere, it is difficult for reform to move forward and achieve due results. The warrant mode can not meet the requirements of the market and the expectations of the system. It is not to add color but to add chaos.

If the warrant mode activates not the positive factors but the negative factors of the market, then the inherent institutional defects of the market itself and the defects of the new institutional design may present a "superposition effect", which will further amplify the existing risks of the market and make the Chinese stock market more dangerous.

Based on the above analysis, the author believes that the warrant business will not trade small advantages for big ones in the long-term development of China's stock market, but just trade small advantages for big ones. Therefore, the warrant business should be put on hold or postponed.

Editing words

Since our newspaper opened a series of discussions on "equity reform and the utility of warrants" on July 20, experts, scholars, insiders and investors have paid warm attention and expressed constructive opinions on the advantages and disadvantages that the implementation of warrant business may bring to the share trading reform.

Recently, many readers have sent letters and called to inquire about this discussion. Now we will answer the relevant questions together:

1. The discussion is not limited to experts or celebrities. Anyone who is concerned about the share trading reform and warrant business can contribute;

2. The contributions should have clear views, concentrated discussions, clear organization, and the number of words should be within 3000;

3. Other issues related to the split share structure reform can also be discussed;

4. In addition to being selected and published in this newspaper, relevant manuscripts will also be sent to relevant departments for decision-making reference.

Author: Han Zhiguo, Special Author of this newspaper