How to bear the risk of falling house prices when the debt ratio of enterprises and individuals has reached the limit
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If you pay attention, you will find that since the second half of last year, two words that you didn't hear before have suddenly appeared in the press frequently, namely "deleveraging" and "debt crisis". These two words are related to each other, and both are closely related to the situation of real estate. These two words complement each other to explain the truth that debt is high, The crisis should not be underestimated. In the past two years, government deleveraging was the first issue to be raised. This issue has been taken action in various regions and has achieved initial results. There is also enterprise deleveraging, which is clearly demonstrated from the Wanda phenomenon. There is also individual deleveraging, which has been indirectly explained by raising the down payment ratio and raising the loan interest rate.
In terms of debt, high leverage is one of the important reasons for the formation of high debt. Statistics show that last year's debt situation, including government debt, residents' debt and non-financial enterprises' debt, together, is almost 250% of GDP. The figure of 250% is really stupid. At the end of last year, the total debt of local and central governments was 29.95 trillion yuan, and the GDP was more than 80 trillion yuan, accounting for about 36%. Corporate debt is more than 130 trillion yuan, accounting for about 160% of GDP, which is very large.
In fact, since 2013, the scale of non-performing loans in the real estate industry has grown rapidly. With the continuous efforts of regulatory policies, the adjustment range of the real estate market will continue to increase, and the non-performing loan rate is expected to reach about 1.5% in 2018. Because the average down payment ratio in China in the past few years was generally more than 30%, as long as the house price did not fall significantly, the security of bank mortgage loans was relatively high. However, the debt ratio of some real estate enterprises is relatively high, and the risk is relatively large.
According to statistics, the average debt ratio of the top ten real estate companies in China has reached 79.6% - 7960 for every 100 million assets Million. The real estate company borrows money from the bank to buy land and build buildings, builds a mortgage, lends money to the bank, and then builds again and again. Real estate companies have a large amount of advance receipts, which is also an important reason for the high asset liability ratio. The risk is that enterprises have accumulated a large amount of debt in this process. For example, Rongchuang borrowed up to The company's book cash is only 92.4 billion yuan and the asset liability ratio is 91.92%. Even a stable development enterprise like Vanke, its asset liability ratio is as high as 82%。 If the house price drops significantly, coupled with the superposition effect of the policy of purchase restriction, which makes the market transaction volume drop sharply, the capital chain of the real estate enterprise is likely to break.
Of course, we know that for development enterprises, debt is not equal to net debt, because pre-sale housing funds are included in the liability account, and can only be included in the income account after the delivery of the house. However, due to the implementation of the ceiling pre-sale policy, and the pre-sale payment is not full, the debt risk will not change much because of the pre-sale payment. The latest statistics show that the total liabilities of 63 listed real estate enterprises that have disclosed their annual report performance exceed 3 trillion yuan, with a year-on-year growth rate of 34%. In 2017, the average debt ratio of 63 listed real estate enterprises was 78.6%, up 1.9 percentage points over the previous year. Among them, there are 18 companies whose asset liability ratio exceeds 80% of the red line, accounting for more than 29%. The debt ratio of real estate enterprises is rising, which means that the risk is increasing.
In 2016, the net debt ratio of Rongchuang Company increased from 75.9% in 2015 to 121.5%. After purchasing some assets of Wanda last year, the net debt ratio reached 260%。 Rongchuang hopes to speed up sales next, but under the most strict regulation in history, the planned price of Rongchuang may not be achieved in many cities, which will inevitably bring new debt risks. The highest net debt ratio of Yunnan Urban Investment once reached 543%, which is certainly not an isolated event. At present, there is a common view that the real estate has kidnapped the economy, and the government will not allow the house price to really fall. From the above data, we can see that the cumulative effect has far exceeded the limit. Even if the government really does not want the housing price to decline, the only way is to continue to tolerate the increase of debt ratio. Is this possible? Make the powder magazine bigger and bigger!
At the end of 2017, under the background of multiple regulatory authorities jointly promoting de channel and deleveraging, development enterprises are generally facing the pressure of capital chain, and various real estate enterprises are trying to raise funds through various channels to ease the contradiction of capital tension. In the past, loans from banks were as convenient as taking money from your own pocket, but now they have been significantly tightened, and trust and other financing means have also been strictly restricted, making it impossible to raise funds on a large scale as in the past. Real estate enterprises have broadened their financing channels, and many real estate enterprises have sought overseas financing channels. However, for some small and medium-sized real estate enterprises, other ways are difficult. Some began to turn to underground financial organizations to finance through usury, thus further expanding the risk. Private lending funds are a double-edged sword that can help enterprises make up for short-term cash flow gaps. However, if the market wind changes, the risks of private lending will quickly be exposed.
Data shows that the ratio of household loans to household savings deposits in China has risen from about 25% in 2007 to more than 60% at present. However, the ratio of annual new loans to annual new deposits in China's household sector rose from an average of 50% between 2005 and 2007 to 97% between 2014 and 2016. The year 2016 was a turning point: there was a phenomenon that the increment of household deposits was gradually lower than that of household loans in China that year.
Data shows that China's household leverage ratio has been rising year by year. From 2006 to 2016, the leverage ratio increased from 11% to 45%, and by the end of September 2017, it reached about 50%, a threefold increase in 10 years. According to JPMorgan Chase, China's household leverage ratio may further rise to 61% in 2020. The total amount of household debt in China reached US $5.9 trillion (38.9 trillion yuan) in September 2017, more than ten times the amount ten years ago. In terms of the proportion of household debt in China's GDP, since the global financial crisis in 2008, household debt has risen from less than 20% of GDP to more than 45% in the past decade. Among the consumer loans, the medium and long-term loans dominated by housing loans accounted for nearly 80%. The total amount was huge. The household debt ratio rose sharply, with millions of assets on the surface, but it was actually a debt. When house prices fell, a large group of losers naturally formed. Those who borrow money from their parents, relatives and friends to make a down payment should be the most leveraged group in Chinese families. Housing prices fluctuate, and these people have the greatest risk of family debt. (By Ma Yuecheng)
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